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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Don't fear the orange—beware the white revolution 
The Kremlin political elite has been concerned about the possibility of political 
unrest, even revolution, upsetting their plans for succession in 2008.  To date, 
most of the speculation has focused on the possibility of crowds mobilizing 
(perhaps with the help of foreign-financed civic organizations) to protest election 
results á la the color revolutions. 
 
In response to this dread scenario, Putin's closest advisers, such as Vladislav 
Surkov, have devised schemes to mobilize their own crowds of young 
demonstrators.  Recently, reports have surfaced about the education of these 
youth groups expanding beyond politics and mass mobilization to encompass 
crowd control…of a violent nature. (1) 
 
With all the succession speculation and preparation for a constitutionally-
scheduled transition, it seems possible, if not probable, that a challenge to the 
best-laid plans of Kremlin apparatchiki could come from an unforeseen direction, 
and that it could be cloaked in an unexpected color: 
 
Dateline: Moscow, 15 May 2008 
The crowds in Manezh Square gather in front of the History Museum, encircling 
the specter of Marshal Zhukov atop his rearing steed, and call out for a decision 
– a resolution to the lengthy debate and discussion among historians, 
philosophers and a cross-section of scholars, and a tally of the vote that will 
decide the future of the nation.  It is not the result of the country's fifth presidential 
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election that is in question, that result has been made moot by the startling 
revelation of a secret agreement signed by the highest authorities in the country 
as the tumultuous 1990s came to a close, an agreement that supersedes the 
result of any election. 
 
A small crowd gravitates towards the Lenin Museum, where the porch, which 
would normally be the backdrop for fiery nationalist speeches is cramped instead 
with confused and leery orators who have trimmed their rhetoric from the 
bloodthirsty condemnation of post-Soviet societies' ills to the affirmation of 
nationhood:  "Rossiya! Rossiya!"  There is no evidence that the occupants of the 
porch have a unanimous vision of which resolution would most benefit Rossiya, 
but they wait, like the crowd, like the viewers at home and abroad, for an answer, 
the hint of a signal of what direction developments will next take. 
 
The clamor of a helicopter touching down within the Kremlin walls sets off 
another round of cheering and calls, most of the mob hollers, "Tsarevich!"  A 
quieter, but equally fervent group answers "Mama! Mama!"  
 
Russia's first president, Boris Yel'tsin, hobbles along a familiar path to the 
Kremlin's presidential offices to meet his successor, Vladimir Putin, who has 
been sequestered with the head of the Constitutional Court, Valeri Zorkin, and 
Patriarch Aleksei, waiting for the verdict from the scholars gathered in the History 
Museum. 
 
Anatoli Chubais, the man who set in motion these astonishing events, finishes 
his latest round of interviews with the international press, where he explains yet 
again about the sealed, secret documents, signed more than a decade ago, and 
the decisions that led to their drafting.  The recent revelation of the secret 
agreements is less difficult to explain: Russia was devolving into a police state 
with sham elections, which only served to confirm the power of a Chekhist 
regime.  This was never the intention of Russia's father of democracy; Yel'tsin's 
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true intentions had to be revealed to the public, and Chubais was therefore duty-
bound to bring these secret agreements to light. 
 
On Megatron screens around central Moscow, "Mama," the Grand Duchess 
Maria Vladimirovna, demurs that her ambitions are not for herself, but for her 
son, the Grand Duke Georgi Mikhailovich.   Maria Vladimirovna and the Grand 
Duke have been ensconced for weeks at Tsarskoe Selo, in the St. Petersburg 
area.  It is now their turn to pace the grounds and wait for the politics of the day 
to play out.  Every day, the crowds around the palace have grown, fresh flowers 
line the streets, and thousands wait for an appearance by the young Grand Duke 
and his mother.  Maria Vladimirovna recounts again her meetings with President 
Yel'tsin in the mid-1990s, describing for the crowds in St. Petersburg, in Moscow 
and around the world how their discussions resembled the kitchen whisperings of 
concerned parents as they discussed their children's future:  what would be best 
for the people, for Russia?  The only conclusion possible was an eventual 
restoration of the monarchy, a return of the Tsar. (2) 
 
At the time, her son was too young to consider shouldering the responsibility to 
lead such a great nation.  Now in his mid-twenties, the Grand Duke was ready to 
try, and so, apparently, was Russia.  
 
The Putin interregnum had strengthened the country economically, and now, with 
the help of constitutional experts, sociologists, psychologists, and grief 
counselors, a Tsar would be returned to Russia, to serve as the father figure for a 
nation buffeted by deep ideological and economic shifts in recent years. 
 
As soon as the scholars, philosophers, writers (including the great Russian 
moralist writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn), and, of course, lawyers at the History 
Museum reached a verdict on the legality of the grand Duchess' claim to the 
throne, she would abdicate in favor of her son (at least that is the plan). 
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Constitutional Court Chairman Zorkin had been working day and night with 
representatives from both the Yel'tsin and Putin Kremlin teams – the writers of 
the constitution and the architects of the current political structures.  A 
constitutional monarchy, bolstered by a strong Prime Ministerial government, 
renamed the Imperial Chancery (headed, at least for the time being by the 
outgoing President, no doubt), would provide the best hope for a resolution of the 
nation's ills and a permanent restoration of the state's grandeur.  
 
As the historians emerged to confirm the succession, and set in motion a new 
round of voting that would finally see the majority of Russian voters affirming a 
new constitution, the crowd in downtown Moscow: the National Bolsheviks, 
Communists, United Russia and Just Russia supporters, the remnants of the 
Yabloko democrats and SPS voters, and, loudest of all, the Nashi youth cheered 
and waved Russian flags—both the black, yellow and white and the red, white 
and blue tri-colors and the double eagle, even the St. Andrew's blue and white.  
A new Russian color revolution indeed. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Marching in agreement: Are the Kremlin's defenders being trained for street 
brawls with the operation?" by Ilya Yashin, Novaya gazeta, No. 20, 22 Mar 07, p. 
3; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(2) The possibility of a secret agreement regarding the return of the Romanov 
dynasty has been raised in several sources.  For example, "Can a Czar's 
Receding Heir Line Return?" by Lee Hockstader, Washington Post Foreign 
Service, Washington Post, 13 Jan 97 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Robyn Angley 
 
Out of the shoot: Just Russia and regional elections 
Russia's newest "opposition" party has fared remarkably well in the March 
elections. Just Russia, a center-left amalgam of the Rodina (Motherland) Party, 
Party of Life, and the Party of Pensioners, surpassed United Russia in the 
Stavropol proportional representation voting, leading to Stavropol governor 
Alexander Chernogorov's ouster from the party by State Duma Speaker and 
United Russia head Boris Gryzlov for "failing to accomplish his mission" and calls 
for the governor to step down from his post. (1)  (Not surprisingly, Just Russia 
also has rejected a proposal that it accept Chernogorov as a member.) Just 
Russia earned the second highest number of votes in four out of the fourteen 
regions that went to the polls on 11 March, and took third place in seven others. 
 
Just Russia, while in supposed opposition to the dominant party of United 
Russia, is staunch, nevertheless, in its support for Putin and his policies. 
Although there has been considerable verbal sparring between the two pro-
Kremlin parties in the run-up to the voting, which was seen as the de facto start 
to the Duma elections, the two parties managed to agree fairly quickly on policies 
espoused by the Kremlin. For instance, United Russia agreed to support Just 
Russia leader and Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov's bid as the 
senatorial incumbent from Saint Petersburg, despite friction between the two 
groups. 
 
Just Russia's platform draws extensively on left-leaning rhetoric. Included in a 
recent interview with party leader Sergei Mironov, for example, were the following 
comments: "Only socialist ideology, socialist ideas unite people. By calling 
ourselves a party that protects working people, obviously, we advocate socialist 
ideals and we will insist on this path for our country. Personally, I do not want to 
build capitalism in Russia." (2) 
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Looking forward to the upcoming Duma elections, Mironov is banking on Just 
Russia's recent success and hoping to cobble together an opposition coalition 
with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by Gennady 
Zyuganov, and ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party 
(LDPR). The Communists have rejected such a possibility, claiming plausibly that 
Just Russia's policies are nearly identical to those of United Russia. (3)  It 
appears that Just Russia's has a choice between two strategies: To siphon votes 
away from the CPRF and LDPR; or to co-opt those parties into an opposition 
bloc in hopes of gaining a majority in the Duma. 
 
Either way, the Kremlin has little to fear from the new party on Russia's political 
scene. 
 
The "suicide" of Ivan Safronov 
Kommersant journalist Ivan Safronov died on 2 March after falling from a fifth 
floor window in what investigators are content to label a suicide. Safronov, a 
Space Forces colonel who became a journalist after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
previously had published several stories that reflected unfavorably upon the 
military establishment. Information released by Kommersant shortly after his 
death indicated that Safronov's next article, which never made it to press, may 
have threatened the financial prospects of elements of the military. 
 
In February, Safronov traveled to the United Arab Emirates to observe an 
international weapons bazaar. Specifically, Safronov intended to investigate the 
claim that Russia had made an arrangement involving the sale of Su-30 jets to 
Syria and S-300V surface-to-air missiles to Iran. (4)  According to some sources, 
MiG-29 fighters and Iskander-E ballistic missiles also were part of the deal. (5)  
The potential sale of Iskander missiles to Syria raised considerable concerns 
because the missiles' range would give Syria the capability to strike at targets 
throughout Israel. The arms sales to both Middle Eastern countries were to take 
place with Belarus as an intermediary, allowing bureaucrats to skim export 
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earnings off the top. (Belarus, through the head of the press center of the State 
Secretariat of the Belarusian Security Council, Uladzimir Nestsyarovich, denied 
the plan, stating that "no evidence has ever been presented." (6)) While proving 
extremely lucrative for corrupt officials, this deal certainly would not help the 
already tense situation in the Middle East. 
 
Safronov's most recent investigation was not the only time he had unearthed a 
weapons scandal. Last fall, Safronov released information concerning the three 
consecutive failed test-launches of the new Bulava R-30 naval ICBM. The 
Defense Ministry imposed a prohibition on information about the status of the 
Bulava missiles' testing. Under existing nuclear agreements, the US had been 
informed of the tests beforehand; therefore the ban was not a means of guarding 
information from export abroad, but rather from being released to the Russian 
public. Safronov exposed the Bulava scandal and earned the antagonism of the 
Defense Ministry. 
 
Given Safronov's unfavorable coverage of past weapons scandals and his recent 
investigations into weapons sales to Syria and Iran, his death is suspicious, at 
the very least. He left no suicide note, and his family claims that he had no 
reason to commit suicide. The frequency of violent, unsolved deaths among 
journalists in Russia, including those of Anna Politkovskaya and Paul Klebnikov, 
does not auger well for a thorough investigation into Safronov's demise. His 
"suicide" marks the continued danger to and decline of media freedom in Russia. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Stavropol governor won't be admitted to Just Russia Party," ITAR-TASS, 18 
Mar 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.  
(2) "Russia's new left-wing party eyes Communist Party's electorate," NTV Mir, 
26 Feb 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
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(3) "Communist deputy leader rules out cooperation with A Just Russia," ITAR-
TASS, 24 Mar 07 via World News Connection (WNC).  
(4) "Ivan Safronov was driven to death," Kommersant, 6 Mar 07; RusData Dialine 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.  
(5) Pavel Felgenhauer, "Non-combat casualties," Novaya gazeta, 12 Mar 07; 
WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(6) "Belarus dismisses illegal arms sales charges after journalist death," 
Belaplan, 6 Mar 07; via OSC Translated excerpt (WNC). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Trepashkin: State revenge for Litvinenko allegations? 
In October 2003, Mikhail Trepashkin, a lawyer and former FSB officer was 
arrested on charges of treason. The FSB alleged that classified documents, 
which Trepashkin supposedly was planning to pass on to foreign powers, had 
been discovered in his apartment. Although the espionage allegation was based 
largely on hearsay, Trepashkin was convicted and sentenced to serve a four-
year sentence.  
    
At the time of his arrest, Trepashkin was representing one of two defendants in a 
trial over the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow. Trepashkin apparently 
possessed evidence implicating the FSB in the atrocity that he planned to bring 
to light during the trial. As such, it seemed safe to conclude that his arrest was a 
"silencing exercise," ordered at the highest levels. (1)  
    
In the aftermath of Alexander Litvinenko’s death last November, Trepashkin, 
remarkably, has been able to make his voice heard on the case. Firstly, he 
succeeded in dispatching a letter from prison in Nizhny Tagil, in which he claimed 
that the FSB had established a hit squad with orders to eliminate Litvinenko. (2)  
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Perhaps more remarkably, the BBC succeeded in speaking to Trepashkin 
directly via a phone smuggled into prison by a Russian film maker. In a 
conversation recorded for BBC’s “Panorama,” Trepashkin claimed that he had 
been assigned the advance surveillance work with orders to “find the route to 
Litvinenko…discover his pattern of movement, his meeting places. I realized they 
wanted to send one person to find his whereabouts, and the group will follow.” (3)  
    
Trepashkin’s allegations, as well as the fact that he was somehow accessible, 
have now brought a reaction. On 9 March, a court in Nizhny Tagil ruled that 
Trepashkin should be transferred to a higher security “general colony.” According 
to his lawyer, the sentence was imposed due to Trepashkin’s violation of 
“sentencing regulations.” (4)  At this juncture, it seems evident that Trepashkin’s 
change in status is designed both to ensure he cannot speak out any longer, as 
well as to punish his verbosity. Given the fact that Trepashkin apparently is being 
denied the necessary medical care for his asthma, (5) the message being sent is: 
we can make your life even worse. So keep quiet.  
 
FSB touts law-enforcement success 
On 15 March, the FSB announced that it had smashed an international gang, 
“engaging in human trafficking and illegal immigration,” specifically from South-
East Asian and CIS countries to Western Europe. Russia apparently was the hub 
of the operation. (6)  
    
The group used “dummy firms” in several Russian towns as cover. These front 
businesses subsequently falsified employment contracts with dual-nationality 
Russian citizens wishing to move abroad, in order to obtain their foreign 
passports. Once passports had been obtained, the firms then created Schengen 
visa documents on the passports—replacing the owner’s photos with those of 
persons being trafficked. (7)  Those wishing to reach Western Europe were 
forced to pay between three and five thousand Euros for their documents.  
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According to the FSB’s spokesman, the law enforcement operation was an 
international effort involving Uzbek, Italian, Finnish and Russian authorities. “Key 
gang leaders” from Russia, the Ukraine and Moldova were “caught red-handed.” 
(8)  The 20 individuals captured apparently included the head of the gang, a 
“Russian state official.” (9)  The FSB has stated that six criminal cases have 
been filed, and that the investigation is ongoing. As yet, no announcement has 
been made as to the “state official’s” identity, his job title, or even the department 
of the government in which he worked. It seems safe to assume that the 
department involved is connected with law enforcement or immigration in some 
manner. As such, FSB employees cannot be above suspicion.  
    
At this point in time, no reason for doubting the veracity of the FSB’s claim exists. 
Human trafficking operations are prevalent across Eastern Europe. It is possible, 
however, that the FSB is exaggerating the level of criminal operation—as well as 
its own achievement. The agency has been the target of some serious criticism 
of late. What better way to silence the critics, than by demonstrating the agency’s 
efficiency and humanity in busting what is essentially a “slave trade” operation? 
 
FSB director in Caucasus 
In mid-March, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev traveled to Chechnya to preside at 
the opening of the agency’s new headquarters in Grozny alongside Chechen 
President Ramzan Kadyrov. (10)  It seems clear that the occasion was designed 
to demonstrate Moscow’s trust in the loyalist government; indeed an 
announcement was given that authority would be partially restored to the 
Chechen government in the law-enforcement field. Kadyrov announced that as a 
result of negotiations with Eduard Petrukhin, deputy head of the Russian Federal 
Penal Service, Chechen criminals convicted in other regions of the Russian 
Federation will be returned to serve their sentences in the Chechen Republic. 
(11)  Kadyrov will “personally supervise” construction of two penal colonies by 
the end of 2007, after which an initial 1,000 prisoners will be transferred. (12)  
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The occasion also was used to announce a major new drive to capture or kill the 
“last Chechen warlords Akhmed Zakayev and Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev,” who 
“remain at large.” (13)  Patrushev’s trip included the viewing of a new FSB 
training complex in Dagestan, which is specifically to be used for the FSB’s 
Special Forces Units, (14) including the Alpha Team. It seems likely that this 
facility will serve as a “launch-pad”  into Chechnya, presumably for special-forces 
units conducting a hunt for the individuals named by Patrushev. 
 
Update: Russia complains of delay in investigation 
Russian officials involved in the Litvinenko case have stated that they have a list 
of some 100 people to be questioned, including Boris Berezovsky. (15)  
According to Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Zyvagintsev, as of mid-
March, permission has not yet been granted for Russian officials to travel to 
London. Zyvagintsev expressed frustration, claiming that Russian authorities had 
waived rules for the British, and that reciprocity should follow. (16)  British 
authorities apparently have held up the investigation because the Crown 
Prosecution Service  (CPS) has asked police to unearth more details before 
proceeding with the case. Scotland Yard has responded by stating that “we 
ensure all due processes are carried out.” (17)  Given Russia’s obstruction of 
British investigations in December and January, whereby officers were refused 
access to witnesses as well as locations around Moscow, complaints by the 
Russian Prosecutor’s office should be taken with a pinch of salt at best, and 
viewed as downright hypocritical at worst. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX, Number 09 (12 
Jun 04) 
(2) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 5 (5 Dec 06)  
(3) “How To Poison a Spy,” 22 Jan 07 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/6276225 .stm.  
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(4) “Russian Court Orders Stricter Confinement For Former Russian Security 
Officer Trepashkin,” International Herald Tribune, 9 Mar 07 via 
www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/09/europe/EU-GEN-Russia-Security-Officer-
Trial.php.  
(5) “Russia; Further Information On Health Concern/Denial of Medical Treatment: 
Mikhail Ivanovich Trepashkin,” Amnesty International Urgent Action Network, 13 
Marc 07 via www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460072007.  
(6) “FSB Routs Human Trafficking Group,” ITAR-TASS, 15 Mar 07 via Lexis 
Nexis Academic Universe.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8) “Human Trafficking Group Busted in Russia,” ITAR-TASS, 15 Mar 07 via 
Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  
(9) Russian Special Service Busts Human Trafficking Ring Set Up By State 
Official,” RTR Rossiya, Moscow, in Russian, 15 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  
(10) ITAR-TASS, 16 Mar 07; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis Nexis 
Academic Universe. 
(11) “Russian Security Chief Opens New FSB Building in Chechen Capital,” NTV 
Mir, Moscow, in Russian, 14 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis Nexis Academic 
Universe.  
(12) Ibid.  
(13) “FSB To Seek Detention of Chechen Warlords Remaining At Large,” ITAR-
TASS, 15 Mar 07 via Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  
(14) “FSB Director Accepts Several FSB Facilities in N Caucasus,” ITAR-TASS, 
15 Mar 07 via Lexis Nexis Academic Universe   .  
(15) “Russia Wants to Question 100 People in UK ex-Spy Probe,” RIA Novosti, 
12 Mar 07 via Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  
(16) “British Prosecutors May Explain Hold Up in Litvinenko Inquiry,” The 
Moscow Times, 19 Mar 07 via Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  
(17) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Russian mystery weapon 
 Russia’s objection to US plans of deploying a missile defense system in Poland 
and the Czech Republic is continuing at a fevered pitch. This reaction has 
intensified, following a statement by the head of the US Missile Defense Agency, 
Lieutenant General Henry Obering. On 1 March, Obering mentioned that “the 
Caucasus could prove an attractive location for an anti-missile defense station.” 
(1)  Additionally, on 14 March Obering and a US delegation met in Kiev with 
officials from the Defense Ministry, Security Council, and the President’s office, 
regarding US plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. (2)  Despite clear 
statements that the US has no intention of placing any part of the missile system 
in Ukraine, Russia continues with its objections.   
      
Russia's reaction has taken several different forms.  Last month Chief of the 
General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, made statements in the media that Russia was 
strongly considering withdrawing from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty. (3)  Many believe this “consideration” not only to be a poor 
strategic idea, but also an idle threat meant to dissuade the US and its partner 
countries from proceeding with their plans.  Another more mysterious response 
came during a speech on 1 February when President Putin said Russia would 
develop an effective response to the US action.  He went on to say that “all our 
responses will be asymmetric but highly effective.” (4)  
      
Waiting to learn what Putin meant by “asymmetric” may have come to an end.  At 
a recent “meeting of the government’s Military-Industrial Commission, Senior 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov announced the launch of a project aimed at 
developing a fifth-generation surface-to-air (SAM) missile system.” (5)  This 
announcement came in conjunction with news that the delay-ridden S-400 
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“Triumph” missile system finally will be deployed outside of Moscow in June 
2007.  The S-400 (NATO designated SA-20) is an upgraded version of the S-300 
(SA-10), but with twice the range and two-and-a half times the firepower.  
However, it still uses the same archaic, 1970’s era electronics as the previous 
system. (6)  Despite using previously deployed technology, the S-400 still 
suffered significant development delays.  As an illustration, the 12 February 1999 
issue of Aerospace Daily ran an article titled “New Russian ‘Triumph’ SAM Nearly 
Ready for Domestic Use, Export.” (7)  Obviously this wasn’t the case, and the 
system subsequently was stalled by both technical difficulties and major funding 
shortfalls.   
      
In describing the new “fifth-generation” system, Ivanov described it as "a very 
substantial and costly project that is unique in terms of innovation.” (8)  He also 
went on to promise that, because the project is about ensuring security for 
Russia, it must remain on a strict timeline to be completed no later than 2015. (9)  
However, “the fifth-generation system only exists in the imaginations of weapons 
designers at present.” (10)  The system is intended to serve all feasible purposes 
by protecting against aircraft, missiles, and space weapons.  However, as Pavel 
Felgenhauer explained in a 7 March piece on the subject, “it has long been 
demonstrated that it’s fundamentally impossible to design a system which is 
equally effective against aerial, ballistic, and space targets.  Apparently, no one 
has explained this to Ivanov.” (11)  The government-owned Almaz-Antei defense 
production company, known for the S-300, S-400, Pechora-2A, Buk-M1, and Tor-
M1 missile systems, is likely to be charged to lead the consortium effort.  
Technical expertise of the Air Force, Navy, Ground Troops, and Missile Defense 
Troops will be pooled on the project to design a standardized surface-to-air 
weapon. (12)   It should be interesting to keep an eye on the “strict” 8-year 
development timeline of this project for which the technology isn’t even 
understood, especially in light of the 8+ years it has taken simply to upgrade the 
S-300 into the S-400.   
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Chief of the Russian Air Force, General Vladimir Mikhailov said, “The system will 
undoubtedly inherit the best features of the S-300 and S-400 systems, but will be 
designed using advanced technology.” (13)  It may be worthwhile to note whether 
the fire control system will be designed using “advanced technology” or will be 
based on previous models.  The effectiveness of the S-300 and S-400 systems 
has been found to be completely dependent on the capability of the personnel 
that operates it. (14)  These systems, which may outperform the US’s Patriot 
system in staged demonstrations and while under the control of the best qualified 
crews, are likely to lose significant combat effectiveness when controlled by 
disgruntled, underpaid and ill-trained conscripts on a day-to-day basis.   
     
While the term “fifth-generation” serves to grab attention and to whip up 
excitement about efforts being undertaken to build an impenetrable defense, it 
also forewarns of the obviously exorbitant costs that will be incurred in its 
development.  This isn’t the first time we’ve heard of Russia’s fifth-generation 
missile defense technology.  The exact same term was used in 2004 when 
Russia was touting the research discoveries made in another mysterious missile 
defense program.  In August 2004, in an almost identical precursor to recent 
talks, Russian defense officials announced completion of research and 
development of the Samoderzhets or “Autocrat” system. (15)  The system, said 
to outperform all other competitors, was originally estimated to become 
operational in 2012.  However, after an initial flurry of curiosity and excitement in 
the press, nothing more was heard of the system. (16)  Interestingly, given the 
program’s three-year hiatus, the 2012 timeline matches the 2015 completion date 
promised in the most recent “fifth-generation” discussions.   
      
Time will tell whether this round of interest will survive beyond the curiosity stage.  
 
But, Russia’s signals of insecurity over US missile defense plans continue to 
intensify and may provide a significant impetus behind the well-publicized 
announcement of Moscow's new mystery weapon.  
 16 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Blagov, Sergei, “Russia Weighs Response To US Missile Defense Proposal 
for Caucasus,” 6 Mar 07, Eurasia Insight via 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030607_pr.shtml.  
(2) “US General Discusses Missile Defense,” 14 Mar 07, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty via http://www.rferl.org/reports/FullReport.aspx?report=565.  
(3) “Yuri Baluyevski: We Have Invulnerable Weapons,” Rossiiskaya gazeta, 21 
Feb 07, pp. 1, 4 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(4) “Russia Wants US to Sign Deal Saying Militaries Don’t Target Each Other,” 6 
Feb 07, International Herald Tribune via http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id= 
4494306.  
(5) Litovkin, Dmitri, “Sergei Ivanov Summons the Triumph to His Service,” 1 Mar 
07, Izvestia via Lexis-Nexis.   
(6) Felgenhauer, Pavel, “The Fifth-Generation Vacuum Cleaner; The Defense 
Sector is Foisting Unnecessary New Weapons on the State,” 7 Mar 07, Novaya 
gazeta via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) “S-400 (SA-20 Triumf),” 26 Mar 07, MissileThreat.com via 
http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.52/system_detail.asp.  
(8) Poroskov, Nikolai, “Shield Provisions; Russia Wants to Build a New Kind of 
Weapon,” 2 Mar 07, Vremya novostei via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Litovkin, Dmitri, Ibid.  
(11) Felgenhauer, Pavel, Ibid. 
(12) “Russia Aims to Develop New Aerospace ‘Super Weapon,’” 19 Mar 07, 
Vremya novostei; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(13) “Russia’s New Air Defenses to be Based on S-300 and S-400 Systems,” 2 
Mar 07, RIA Novosti via Lexis-Nexis.  
(14) Felgenhauer, Pavel, Ibid. 
(15) “Russia Aims to Develop…,” Ibid. 
(16) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
Peace mission 2007   
China announced last week that for the first time ever, it will deploy its 
indigenously-produced Jian-10 Chengdu fighter aircraft outside the country for 
participation in a military exercise. (1)  Peace Mission 07 is an exercise 
scheduled for 18-25 July 2007 in Russia's Chelyabinsk Oblast', and will include 
not only Chinese and Russian military forces, but also limited numbers of troops 
from other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) states. (2)  The 
announcement came in conjunction with a visit to China by Russian Chief of the 
General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, who also called for “further cooperation 
with China within the framework of the SCO.”  (3) 
 
Ostensibly a military exercise to practice counter-terrorism drills, Peace Mission 
07 will “contribute to world peace and security” and “does not target any third 
country,” said the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, Li Hui.  The purpose of the 
exercise is simply to demonstrate SCO nations’ ability to “crack down on the 
three forces of evil, terrorism, separatism, and extremism.”  (4)  In order to 
execute this broad mandate, Peace Mission 07 will comprise more than 3000 
troops, including a regiment each of Chinese and Russian soldiers.  In addition to 
the Jian-10, the Chinese will also bring their indigenously-produced main battle 
tanks and BTR-96 armored personnel carriers.   There will be a significant 
amount of air support, artillery support, the use of massed armor, and an 
airborne landing.  Cracking down, indeed! (5) 
 
Even more surprising is evidence that there will be the simulated use of a nuclear 
weapon by the adversary forces.  Reminiscent of Peace Mission 05, this year’s 
exercise resembles less of an anti-terrorism drill than a full-scale, state-on-state 
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conventional fight.  Two years ago, the exercise was held on the Chinese 
Shandong Peninsula and included an amphibious landing backed by strategic 
bombers.  It too, was touted as an anti-terrorism exercise, but seemed much 
more like a test invasion of Taiwan.  (See ISCIP Analyst Volume XIII, Number 4).  
Although it may be possible that this year’s maneuvers do indeed concern a 
terrorist adversary (albeit nuclear-armed), it seems more pointedly designed to 
“give the United States a certain sign.” (6)  In light of recent escalated tensions 
between Russia and the West, this assessment may prove very accurate.  
 
Regardless of the true intent, the importance of these maneuvers to the Russian 
leadership cannot be overestimated.  Reportedly, both President Putin and PRC 
Chairman Hu Jingtao will be in attendance.  General Baluyevsky visited Beijing to 
discuss the exercise just this month, and he will be followed in a few weeks by 
Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov.  Even the size and the scope of the 
exercise indicate its importance.  Originally planned to be at the Battalion level 
(less than 1000 troops), the Chinese requested an increase to 2000.  The 
Russian military leadership not only accepted that proposal, but upped the ante 
to 3000 troops, where it stands now.  In addition, Russia also proposed 
combining this exercise with joint military exercises being conducted under the 
auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). (7) 
 
China, for its part, accepted the proposed size increase, but vehemently opposed 
any association with the CSTO.  The Chinese military leadership claimed that “it 
was not prepared for such close military-political cooperation with so 
geographically distant countries as Armenia and Belarus.”  Military analysts see 
this as another of Russia's continuing efforts to persuade the 1.5 billion-strong 
China into the CIS fold, thereby establishing a very definite “pole” to counter US 
and Western predominance.  Although China has displayed its traditional caution 
in this regard, at least from the point of this military exercise, the SCO military 
component still does not seem to be as “anti-terrorist” as it purports to be. (8)  
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The Russian Foreign Ministry’s ballistic missile shield 
In what may have been a faux-pas of epic proportions, the Commander of 
Russian Space Troops, Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin claimed to be 
investigating the feasibility of installing space surveillance radars at Russian 
embassies in a number of countries, allowing him “to adjust flight missions 
depending upon various contingencies.”  Very specifically identifying the type of 
equipment he was referring to—Sazhen quantum optical stations—General 
Popovkin did not say which or how many countries were under consideration.  
He did say in his interview with Novosti kosmonavtiki that he was primarily 
concerned with getting “visual pictures of second stage and booster activation we 
cannot receive from Russia.” (9)  Claiming that the equipment would fit into a 
single office and require maintenance from one technician, once a year, he 
indicated that these remote stations would be controlled by a single command 
center in Krasnoznamensk. (10) 
 
Within one day of this very revealing interview, the other shoe dropped 
(presumably).  Russian Space Forces, in a 20 March news release, stated that 
“no ballistic early warning radars have ever been deployed, nor may be deployed 
[at Russian embassies abroad], in accordance with international law.” (11) 
 
So the question now becomes, was this simply General Popovkin speculating on 
future plans of his own, without inter-agency coordination?  Or, was this an 
unintentional breach of security, inadvertently identifying plans that Russia would 
rather not reveal?  More information is required to tell definitively, but there are 
some subtle signs to consider.  The details of the interview were very specific, 
naming not only types of equipment, but also specific places where command 
and control installations were to be established.  In addition, he also claimed to 
be “looking into the issue together with the Foreign Ministry,” which points to a 
coordinated effort rather than a unilateral action by the Space Forces. (12)  From 
these details, it seems to be more of a security breach (perhaps an intentional 
leak) of an actual initiative rather than idle speculation on mere possibilities…. 
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By Alexey Dynkin 
 
The bear and the dragon 
Chinese President Hu Jintao is scheduled to visit Russia from March 26 to 28. In 
addition to speaking directly with Putin for the first time, Hu Jintao also plans to 
meet with Prime Minister Fradkov, State Duma Chairman Gryzlov, and, 
interestingly, President Shaimiev of the Tatarstan Republic. (1)  He will 
complement the visit by attending the opening ceremonies of the “China Year” – 
a series of events designed to promote cultural exchange that follows a similar 
“Russia Year” held in 2006. According to Assistant Foreign Minister Li Hui, the 
visit will have five objectives: “deepening political mutual trust, promoting 
pragmatic cooperation, widening humanities exchanges, strengthening local 
cooperation, and reinforcing strategic cooperation in international affairs.” (2)  
While Li did not specifically mention military cooperation as being on the agenda 
for the meeting, he did refer to a joint military exercise of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization that will be held in Russia sometime later this year. (3) 
 
As far as strategic cooperation is concerned, the main topics on the agenda are 
expected to be the six-party talks regarding the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program and the Iranian nuclear question. Regarding the latter, the timing of the 
meeting is significant. Following the passing of Resolution 1747 of the UN 
Security Council on March 24, imposing additional (though as yet hardly 
overwhelming) sanctions on Iran for its refusal to comply with the IAEA, acting 
US representative to the United Nations Alejandro D. Wolff said that "while we 
hope that Iran complies with this resolution...the United States is fully prepared to 
take additional measures in 60 days should Iran choose another course." (4)  
While Wolff did not specify what these additional measures might entail, the 
implication of his statement for the rest of the Security Council is that each 
member state now has two months to come up with its final position. It is 
possible, therefore, that the two presidents will use the upcoming meeting to 
agree upon a common position on the Iranian nuclear question. An unnamed 
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Kremlin source recently noted that both countries are “…interested in 
strengthening the United Nations and increasing the effectiveness of the main 
international mechanism to counter multiple challenges of a contemporary world.” 
(5)  In other words, both China and Russia have an interest in using their 
permanent Council membership as a vehicle for increasing their role in global 
affairs. Since the US appears, based on Wolff’s warning, to be indicating again 
that it might proceed independently of the UN, should the latter fail to satisfy its 
concerns, it would make sense that the topic of Sino-Russian conversation in the 
following days will be how to prevent that from happening. 
 
The wide range of issues to be addressed during Hu Jintao’s visit raises the 
question of whether strategic partnership—the kind of long-term relationship with 
another major country that post-Soviet Russia has thus far been unable to form—
might be imminent. On this question, Hu’s fourth objective—strengthening local 
cooperation—may be the most significant. In theory, it could entail the promotion 
of a cross-border economic zone (elements of which exist already) along the 
lines of the US-Canadian, except that it would be based on Russian energy 
supplies to the ever-expanding Chinese market. While potential for rivalry over 
influence abounds—most notably in Central Asia—the combination of a common 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the US, as well as a cross-border economy could make 
China the closest Russia has had to a strategic partner. 
 
Bushehr as TransSibNeft? 
Some time before tensions between Iran and the West were exacerbated by the 
Iranian seizure of British naval personnel and the imposition of new sanctions by 
the UN Security Council, a fairly heated dispute took place between Russia and 
Iran, concerning delays in payment for Russia’s contracting of the Bushehr 
nuclear power plant. On Wednesday, March 14, head of the Russian Federal 
Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Sergei Kiriyenko told journalists in Bari, Italy, 
that “not a kopeck” has been paid by Iran since January, and that, as a result, the 
launch of the plant would have to be delayed by another two months. (6)  Iranian 
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officials, for their part, vehemently denied any delays in payments; Deputy Head 
of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization for international affairs Mohammad 
Sa'idi called Kiriyenko’s remarks “illogical” and “astonishing.” (7)  Meanwhile, the 
Russian side apparently began demonstrating its willingness to make good on its 
threat to pull out of the contract by recalling workers from the power plant; 
according to a US official, a “good number” of the some 2,000 Russian 
employees at the plant already have left. (8) 
 
One implausible version concerning the dispute, presented in an article in 
Kommersant, suggested that “the current situation completely suits the 
authorities in both Iran and Russia - Iran can freeze the Bushehr project with a 
reference to the problems of its partner (to stave off sanctions without losing 
face), while Russia can point to Iran's refusal to pay for the nuclear plant." (9)  (In 
fact, Bushehr has no direct link to the proliferation issue.) Since the article 
appeared, sanctions have been imposed anyway, Ahmadinejad has already 
promised to proceed with nuclear enrichment, and Iran has further ratcheted up 
tensions with its detention of British naval personnel. A not much more likely 
explanation for both Russian and Iranian recent actions would be fear of a US 
military strike against the actual proliferation sites; that could explain the removal 
of Russian employees, and, on the Iranian side, the capture of the British sailors 
(which ensures that, in the event of armed conflict, Iran already would have 15 
Western hostages on its tally). But that view, too, has its problems; for one thing, 
it does not seem logical that should a strike take place, Bushehr itself would be 
involved – since that is not where enrichment takes place. In addition, this view 
implies that Iran has been delaying payments partly in order to stall construction 
in the hope of appeasing the US into not launching a military strike – an unlikely 
scenario, given that at the moment Iran is playing from a position of relative 
strength (evidence of which can be seen in its provocative, aggressive actions, 
such as the latest incident).  
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Both sides denied that the dispute had anything to do with the UN resolution (that 
passed eventually on March 24), although some US and European officials 
expressed hope that it did. (10)  For their part, some voices in the Iranian official 
media accused Russia of using Western pressure on Iran to gain advantage over 
it (11) – in the same way that it had used Lukashenko’s international notoriety 
against him in the energy dispute at the end of the previous year. This last 
accusation actually may be the closest to the truth regarding the Russian 
position. Rather than actually moving closer to the American position on Iran, 
Russia is seeking to make Iran dependent on Russian support. In other words, 
the message is, “we will support you in the UN, but you’re going to have to 
accept our terms for the contract, because if you don’t, we will stop the project, 
and then the UN won’t be able to help you.” If that is the case, Iran’s response 
will likely depend on how far along it is in the development of its weapons 
program, and how much it needs Russia's help to fuel the reactor, in order to 
start producing weapons-grade uranium en masse. As long as critical 
components are still missing, Iran will have to accept Russian demands; once 
everything is in place, however, it will no longer need Russian assistance, and, 
as political analyst Vitali Portnikov noted, will probably do what Albania, Egypt 
and Somalia did to the Soviets (12) - turn away from Russia at the first 
opportunity. 
 
Source Notes: 
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2007.” Xinhua News Agency, 21 Mar 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Of precedence and precedents: The Caucasus look to Kosovo 
The UN Security Council is preparing to set the capstone on the Balkan edifice 
that has been under construction ever since NATO's bombs put an end to the 
1998-1999 war between ethnic Albanian separatists and Belgrade forces. By 
scheduling a vote to endorse a package of proposals recently submitted by UN 
envoy Martti Ahtisaari, the UN will decide finally to grant de facto independence 
to Kosovo. (1)  It is possible that Russia, which has historically insisted on its 
special role as protector of the Serbs, will stand on principle and use its veto on 
the Council to block the Kosovo settlement. “The trouble is that you are too 
logical,” objected a senior Russian diplomat to a delegate from the EU. “For us, 
this is an emotional question.” (2)  President Putin and his ministers have made it 
 26 
clear that they will only back a plan for the region that has the support of 
Belgrade.  
    
It is equally possible that Russia will lay aside its sentimental bonds with Serbia 
and recuse itself from the vote, content to gain a strategically powerful precedent 
that may be used to legitimize the claims of rogue territories of the South 
Caucasus. 
    
Principle or bargaining chip? 
US and EU officials have been at pains to stress the uniqueness of the Kosovo 
arrangement. At a press briefing on March 13, Assistant Secretary Fried of the 
US State Department insisted that the UN Security Council is not setting a 
precedent for other separatist communities anywhere in the world. “We have said 
before, and we'll say again as many times as we have to, that Kosovo is not 
precedent for any other area, whether that's Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, 
Transnistria, Corsica or Texas.” (3)  Governments in the South Caucasus, 
unconvinced by the State Department’s glib assurances of support for their 
territorial integrity, were visited by EU special envoy Peter Semneby, who 
reiterated the international community’s commitment to the peaceful settlement 
of the region’s frozen conflicts. (4)  
    
As the issue draws to a vote, Moscow has muted its rhetoric and taken a more 
circumspect approach, buying time to weigh the potential gains and losses to its 
internal stability and geopolitical standing. Hedging his bets in a speech before 
the State Duma on March 21, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, declared 
that, while Kosovo will indeed set a particular sort of precedent, it must not be 
considered as a universally applicable model. “For the first time, independence 
will be gained not by being a component of a former union-member state, as with 
the case of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union [but by a former autonomous 
region]… But projection of this situation in respect to Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transdnistria will not be a correct step.” (5)  His reluctance to seize upon the 
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independence of Kosovo as a legal basis for secessionists’ claims in neighboring 
countries is due, no doubt, to Russia’s own tricky relations with the minority 
populations living within its borders. Having muscled through the appointment of 
Ramzan Kadyrov as president of Chechnya, Moscow is anticipating a period of 
enforced tranquility leading up to next year’s presidential elections. 
 
A vote for precedent 
Others in Russia’s government have not been so equivocal in calling a precedent 
a precedent. In 2006, President Putin drew a sharp parallel between the causes 
for independence in Kosovo and in Georgia’s breakaway regions. Russia, he 
warned, would use the decision of the UN as a precedent in its own dealings with 
the frozen conflicts in Georgia's autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, which, he pointed out, are under de facto Russian military protection, 
just as Kosovo is NATO’s protectorate. (6)  Following Lavrov’s recent speech 
before the State Duma, Deputy Speaker Sergei Baburin brushed aside the 
Foreign Minister’s caveat about using Kosovo's independence as a model and 
instead applauded his use of the term “republics” to refer to the breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (7)  Rather than taking up the fraught 
issue of independence for ethnic minorities, Lavrov finessed the question by 
suggesting that the minority populations in Georgia’s breakaway regions are in 
fact Russian citizens (Russia having unilaterally transferred its citizenship to 
them). “We are ready to develop all kinds of contacts with these republics. The 
people who live there are our citizens. We are responsible for their social 
problems because nobody, except us, has been able to do this so far.” (8)  It 
appears that the cause of secession is not a movement toward independence for 
the regions of the South Caucasus, but an intermediate step toward annexation 
by Russia. 
 
Leaders of the breakaway regions in the Caucasus have been energized by the 
idea of a blueprint for independence implicit in the Kosovo settlement. Sergei 
Bagapsh, the president of Abkhazia (unrecognized by the international 
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community), has called Kosovo “an interesting precedent,” and Eduard Kokoity, 
leader of the rogue government in South Ossetia, has declared that his region 
has an even stronger argument for independence than Kosovo. (9)  The Kosovo 
model added another kink in the already tangled negotiations toward settlement 
of the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, when Yuri Marzlykov, the Russian 
co-chair from the OSCE Minsk Group suggested that the Kosovo settlement be 
used as a precedent “as for the first time in European territory the case concerns 
[legal independence for] a former autonomy.” (10)  The de facto governments of 
breakaway regions in the South Caucasus and elsewhere are eager for 
international recognition and lay great stock in the formalities of Western 
statecraft to attain legitimacy. Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh have all held "plebiscites" within the past year in what 
amounts to a public relations campaign to draw attention to the democratic will of 
their populations to secede from their sovereign states and join with Russia. The 
referenda were uniformly dismissed by the UN, and given only a mute nod of 
approval in Moscow, where officials congratulated the regions on their show of 
democratic discipline, but stopped short of official recognition. Until now, pushing 
for recognition of the overwhelmingly pro-secessionist results of the plebiscites 
did not serve the interests of Moscow; however, with Kosovo cleared for 
independence, Moscow may yet change its tune. For Russia, the territorial 
squabbles on its southern borders are a tactical bargaining chip in a larger, 
geopolitical struggle for influence. 
 
Redrawing the map 
Russia has two choices before it in the Security Council: to veto or to abstain. A 
veto would be a principled stand in solidarity with its Serbian kin. It would also 
complicate any eventual use of the Kosovo issue as a precedent to apply to 
territories within the sovereign states of the Caucasus, where support for 
secessionist parties would give the lie to the principle of national sovereignty. 
Should Russia abstain from the vote and implicitly allow for the breakup of former 
Serbian territories, however reluctantly, then Russia would gain recourse to the 
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principle of regional self-determination, in order to vindicate its annexation of 
strategic regions in the Caucasus. Should such a radical eventuality come to 
pass, no doubt NATO would at last step in to adopt the remainder of the 
countries in the region. Having lost its territorial integrity, Georgia will finally have 
gained membership in NATO. With NATO on its doorstep, Russia will have 
regained an intractable presence in the South Caucasus. The endgame of this 
bleak scenario would be a Caucasus carved up between the Great Powers. 
Happily, precedent does not a prescription make. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Fradkov’s Tashkent visit less than fruitful 
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov recently paid an official visit to Tashkent, 
the first time a Russian prime minister has done so since 1999. (1)  Uzbekistan’s 
decision last summer to rejoin the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) and to enter the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsSec) 
undoubtedly helped provide the impetus for Fradkov’s visit.  Uzbek-Russian 
relations, which cooled after Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security 
Treaty in 1999 and joined the GUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and 
Moldova) instead, have been on the upswing for the past few years, resulting 
primarily in heightened trade relations and increased Russian investment, 
especially in the energy sector. (2)  However, military cooperation, which also 
was expected to increase, has encountered a few roadblocks, causing Russia to 
scale back investment in Uzbek military production facilities and even to cancel 
part of one production contract. (3)  Nor have Russia’s investment strategies in 
Uzbekistan’s hydrocarbon and metal industries quite resulted in the benefits 
either side was expecting, although some might say that it is the Uzbek 
government that is currently receiving the short end of the stick.  Fradkov’s visit 
seemed geared to address these problems, as well as to persuade President 
Karimov to allow further Russian investment into the Uzbek economy. 
 
Unfortunately, the Russian prime minister seems to have fallen short of most of 
his goals, with his biggest achievement being the establishment of a new joint 
venture between the Russian and Uzbek aviation industries called UzRosAvia, 
which will carry out aircraft repair, beginning with Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters.  
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The joint venture’s partners will consist of Russia’s Rosoboronexport and 
Oboronprom and Uzbekistan’s Tashkent Aviation Production Association, named 
after Chkalov, and Uzmakhsusimpeks and will use the facilities of the Chirchiq 
aircraft repair plant.  Russia’s share in the venture will be at least 51%.  Oddly, 
when asked whether the Russian government was moving ahead with its plans 
to transfer the manufacture of its IL-76 (Ilyushin) transport planes from the 
Chkalov plant to Ulyanovsk (in Russia), Fradkov replied: “we are working on this 
too the transfer and creation of a manufacturing centre in Ulyanovsk ,” then 
stated “it will take at least a few years to meet a number of existing contracts,” 
implying that as soon as the Chkalov plant has filled its part of a Chinese order 
for 34 Il-76 military cargo planes and four Il-78 tanker planes (the order was 
contracted between China and Russia in 2005 and then subcontracted to the 
Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Association), production will be moved back to Russia. 
(4)  The Chkalov plant was originally slated to manufacture all of the planes, but 
after production delays and cost overruns (due to a disagreement over 
production costs, the Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Association refused to sign the 
production contract with Rosoboronexport in 2006), Chkalov’s share of the order 
was reduced to only 15 IL-76 aircraft. (5) 
 
Moving production of the Ilyushin aircraft out of Tashkent altogether will be a big 
blow for the local economy; the Chkalov factory employs 80,000 people and is 
one of the largest aircraft assembly plants in Central Asia. (6)  If production 
cutbacks cause reductions in the factory’s workforce, it will put a heavy burden 
on Tashkent’s municipal resources, which already are strained.  Another plan 
being considered is to merge the Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Association with 
Russia’s United Aircraft Building Corporation (UABC), which is 90% state-owned 
and produces aircraft for both military and civilian clients. (7)  Should this plan 
come to fruition, Tashkent might be forced to cede a significant portion of its 
current profits to the Russian government and will most assuredly lose export 
rights to the aircraft produced at Chkalov.  In fact, Fradkov’s own comment 
regarding the possible merger was rather ominous, implying that under Russian 
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control, the plant may not have a rosy future: “[the Chkalov plant] is operating, 
but its prospects need to be soberly assessed.” (8)  Thus, what Fradkov gave 
with one hand, he snatched back with the other, a gravely flawed strategy, if his 
intention was to create goodwill with President Karimov for future discussions on 
establishing a Russian airbase in Uzbekistan. 
 
Russia’s recent economic relations with Uzbekistan outside the military-technical 
sphere have fared somewhat better.  Russia has become Uzbekistan’s most 
important foreign trade partner over the past two years, receiving close to 25% of 
the country’s foreign trade with bilateral trade worth $2.5 billion by the end of 
2006 (an increase of more than $.5 billion from the previous year).  Nonetheless, 
their economic relationship also has experienced a few snags. (9)  A joint venture 
formed between Russian companies Techsnabexport and Rusburmash, the 
Uzbek State Committee for Geology and Mineral Deposits and the Navoi Mining 
and Metals Plant to develop Uzbekistan’s Aktau uranium deposit (estimated at 
4,400 tons with the possibility of a 50% increase after further exploration; the 
country’s total uranium reserves are estimated to be 55,000 tons), which was 
supposed to have been operational by the end of last year, (10) stalled last 
autumn when the project hit a financing shortfall, according to Nikolai Kuchersky, 
general director of Uzbekistan's Navoi Mining and Metals Plant. (11) 
 
Russian investment in Uzbekistan’s natural gas industry has been quite 
successful lately, with both Lukoil and Gazprom garnering substantial shares in 
various production sharing agreements (PSA’s) with Uzbekneftegaz. (12)  
However, Gazprom has been slow to actually carry out its investment promises, 
causing concern among Uzbek officials that the company was failing to fulfill its 
contractual obligations. (13)  In February, Gazprom announced its intention to 
acquire the majority of the Swiss Zeromax GmbH company’s oil and gas assets 
in Uzbekistan.  Zeromax is co-holder in an estimated ten joint and subsidiary 
enterprises, as well as owning a number of gas stations.  The company’s 
subsidiaries are involved in laying gas pipelines and building other energy 
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facilities – thus, Gazprom stands to gain a wide range of assets, if its bid for the 
Zeromax assets is successful. (14)  An unspecified number of Zeromax’s assets 
reportedly are controlled by Gulnara Karimova, President Karimov’s daughter. 
(15)  Fradkov was very positive about Lukoil and Gazprom’s involvement in the 
Uzbek oil and gas industry, stating: “This in general enables us to raise 
cooperation in the gas industry to a qualitatively new level and to speak in 
practical terms of the resources of independent companies with the leading role 
being played in this market by Gazprom.” (16)  However, he made no mention of 
the current disagreements over Gazprom’s investment obligations, which could 
mean that the issue was simply swept under the rug, to be dealt with at a later 
date, hopefully before Gazprom officials make their bid for the Zeromax assets. 
 
Other thorny issues, such as Uzbekistan’s roughly $700 million debt to Russia 
(on which no payments have been made in nearly 10 years) and a substantial 
imbalance in car exports (UzDaewoo exported more than half of the 110,000 
automobiles it produced to Russia, whereas Uzbekistan imported only 3,500 cars 
from Russia) also were not resolved, although the two sides did agree to begin 
negotiations regarding the debt repayment, once again. (17) 
 
In sum, Fradkov’s visit was most notable for what it did not accomplish and for 
the wide range of issues that still need to be resolved, if the Russian government 
hopes to gain an even larger foothold in Uzbekistan’s energy and metal industry, 
as well as in its military sector.  Moscow may not consider the Uzbek 
government’s dissatisfaction with Gazprom and its undoubted annoyance over 
the stalled uranium venture to be of great consequence, but if these issues are 
not resolved in the near future, it could bode ill not only for further Russian 
investment in the Uzbek economy, but for the investments held by Russian 
enterprises there now.  President Karimov has pulled the rug out from under a 
number of Western companies engaged in joint ventures in Uzbekistan; Russian 
companies should not naïvely believe themselves to be immune.  
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UKRAINE 
Kuchmism 2:  Backtracking on reform in Ukraine 
In December of 2004, Ukraine was hailed throughout the world following its 
Orange Revolution.  The revolution – 17 days of massive demonstrations to 
overturn a rigged election – was “a powerful example of democracy for people 
around the world,” US President George W. Bush said at the time. (1) 
 
What a difference two years make.  
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Today, Ukraine remains mired in corruption, the man who led the revolution has 
been forced into near irrelevance, those who were accused of rigging the election 
have returned to power, and the Ukrainian people face vigorous new assaults on 
freedoms that they only just won.    
 
In the last six months, Ukraine has seen a significant increase in contract killings, 
legal and physical assaults on media outlets, and the clear use of the 
prosecutor’s office to intimidate government opponents.   The country faces the 
prospect of seeing a return to the environment that prevailed prior to 2004, and 
Viktor Yushchenko, the man swept to power in the “people’s revolt,” seems 
unable to do anything to stop it.  
 
For reasons perhaps only he understands, President Yushchenko did not move 
to consolidate his authority directly after taking office.  Instead, he chose to 
separate himself systematically from his closest allies, while reaching out to his 
former opponents.  
 
 In the process, he also separated himself from promises he made during the 
revolution.  These included a commitment to solve high profile murders of 
journalists and political opposition leaders, stamp out corruption, codify freedom 
of the press and assembly and introduce a “Western” system of justice.   
 
This pattern first became clear in September 2005 when Yushchenko dismissed 
his ally Yulia Tymoshenko from the post of prime minister.  The prime minister 
had used her position successfully to increase her popularity and had bumped 
heads with Yushchenko's entourage on a number of issues – particularly those 
relating to their alleged business interests.  
    
Further, in August of 2006, following a “Memorandum of Understanding” and a 
“National Unity Agreement,” Yushchenko nominated his defeated presidential 
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and revolution challenger Viktor Yanukovych as the country’s prime minister.  At 
that time, Yushchenko seemed to believe Yanukovych’s lower popularity would 
ensure that he followed the dictates of the president.   It was an astonishing 
miscalculation – and one vehemently warned against by many of Yushchenko’s 
own colleagues.  
 
Since that point, Prime Minister Yanukovych and his allies have battled 
Yushchenko for control over not only the economy, but also foreign policy 
strategy and the security services.  They appear to be close to winning, if they 
haven’t done so already, in part by using Soviet-style tactics. 
 
On 20 March, representatives from the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General’s Office 
(PGO) searched the apartment of former Interior Minister and former Orange 
Revolution organizer Yuriy Lutsenko.  
 
Lutsenko has been one of the sharpest critics of the Yanukovych government in 
recent months and spent February traveling through Ukraine’s regions, building 
support for his People’s Self Defense Movement.  He recently announced plans 
to hold a “March for Fairness” in Kyiv during the Spring.  
 
The PGO announced that the search was part of a criminal case opened against 
Lutsenko, stemming from his work as Interior Minister.  Prosecutors charged that 
Lutsenko had distributed firearms inappropriately to individuals who did not have 
the right to possess them.  The office said 51 handguns had been issued on 
Lutsenko’s order during his two year term in office, and “not all” were justified.  
(2)  The handguns apparently are categorized as “award pistols,” which are 
presented occasionally as gifts for some type of service. 
 
The charge was immediately assailed by Lutsenko’s allies and the majority of 
Ukraine’s media.  The respected Dzerkalo Tyzhnia (Mirror Weekly) wrote: 
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“The prosecutors maintain that a person who does not serve with the Interior 
Ministry may not be awarded firearms on its behalf. Then, what about Lutsenko’s 
predecessor Mylola Bilokon and his deputy Gen. Vasyl Zhuk whose signatures 
stand under similar directives? …  Lutsenko’s predecessors must have handed 
out more than fifty award firearms to persons who were not militia officers. … It 
was only Lutsenko who was searched and questioned. Bilokon is not even 
wanted. Why is the PGO so selective?” (3) 
 
As icing on the cake, the PGO also suggested that Lutsenko possessed an 
Israeli passport and had been granted Israeli citizenship, which would violate 
Ukraine’s single citizenship law.  In a country struggling with anti-Semitism, this 
charge seems well-crafted for the intended audience. 
 
Lutsenko vehemently disputes all charges.  A Kyiv court agreed with him two 
days after the search of his apartment, when it invalidated the search warrant, 
cancelled demands from the prosecutor that Lutsenko come for questioning, and 
found that the prosecutor had not proved probable cause for opening the criminal 
case.  The case was closed.  (4) 
 
Earlier, prosecutors claimed that they had found explosives in the offices of a 
group associated with Lutsenko.  Lutsenko and the group’s leaders (one of whom 
is his brother) angrily denied the charge.  The anger is likely justified, since 
trumped up explosive charges were used often in the past as excuses to arrest 
and/or intimidate political opposition or media members.  The apparent return of 
this tactic should cause grave concern to observers of Ukraine. 
 
While Lutsenko was fending off the prosecutor, Yulia Tymoshenko was 
defending herself against a new attack from the Yanukovych-dominated 
parliament.  
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On 23 March, the Verkhovna Rada asked the PGO to investigate Tymoshenko’s 
dealings as head of the gas intermediary Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine 
(UESU) in the mid-1990s.  A parliamentary commission reported that it had 
questions both as to how UESU debts to Ukraine were eliminated, and how the 
UESU conducted its activities. (5) 
 
Tymoshenko’s allies immediately attacked the vote (238 of 450 deputies 
supported the measure), calling it a “tool for political persecution.”  (6)  
 
Indeed, the charges largely seem to be a rehash of previously aired—and 
dismissed—allegations against Tymoshenko.  From 2000-2004, while 
Tymoshenko worked as one of the leaders of the opposition movement against 
then-President Kuchma, at least half-a-dozen criminal cases were opened 
against her.  One of the charges led to her detention for 40 days.  All were closed 
by various courts for lack of probable cause.  Despite their best efforts, Ukraine’s 
prosecutors were unable to provide documentary proof of their allegations.    
 
It is unclear whether the prosecutor will open a new criminal case against 
Tymoshenko.  It seems fairly unlikely, however.  With their focus on Lutsenko, it 
may be that the prosecutor and the government hope to undercut Tymoshenko’s 
popularity by elevating a new opposition leader.  Attacking her personally would 
achieve just the opposite.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that they are watching Tymoshenko and her allies 
closely.  
 
On 20 March, the State-Controlled Ukrainian National Television Channel 1 
cancelled its only political debate program, Toloka.  The decision by the head of 
the station came the day after Tymoshenko and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, leader of 
President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine parliamentary bloc, appeared on the 
program.  The two representatives of the new “united opposition” received 80 
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percent of the support of callers participating in the program’s poll on the political 
situation.  Within hours, the program was off the air for good. 
 
Our Ukraine said the action showed “a return to the use of old schemes and 
methods: censorship, repressions and political prosecutions.” (7) 
 
The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko suggested that Yanukovych “is afraid of the 
unified opposition and the growth of support for democratic forces,” and 
therefore, is returning to “methods of mocking the basic human right to get 
objective information.”  The Bloc also appealed to the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe to examine the issue.  (8) 
 
The removal of Toloka from the state channel is only the latest in a string of 
attacks on press freedom in Ukraine.  A quick examination of the website of 
Ukraine’s Institute of Mass Information (IMI) tells a disturbing story.  The 
independent trade group has catalogued a string of increasing pressure on the 
media.  
 
Since January 1, the office of a newspaper in Dnipropetrovsk investigating local 
corruption has been burned to the ground, another newspaper in the same 
region had its entire run of papers confiscated after investigating a local mayor’s 
use of budget money, journalists in Vinnytsia were banned from attending city 
council hearings because they were “not covering the council’s activity 
appropriately,” and a journalist in Dnipropetrovsk was severely beaten after 
reporting on a labor dispute at another television station.   (9) 
 
These are but a few of the incidents listed by the IMI. 
 
At the same time, libel suits by politicians against media outlets have increased 
sharply. The respected Ukrayinska Pravda website—one of the first truly 
independent investigative media outlets in Ukraine and an essential element in 
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the Orange Revolution—has been sued six times over the last six months by 
Parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr Moroz, largely for printing statements made by 
other politicians.  It is rare for any media outlet to win a libel case, and UP is no 
exception.  It seems the pre-revolution practice of forcing press outlets out of 
business through libel judgments is alive and well.  
 
The “united opposition” has announced a rally, “Betrayal, Out!,” for 31 March.  
Tymoshenko, Kyrylenko and Lutsenko will address the crowd following a concert 
on Maidan Nezelezhnosti, the main gathering point during the Orange 
Revolution.  In response, Yanukovych announced his party will bring “half a 
million” people to the Maidan at the same time, as part of a hastily announced 
Forum of National Unity. (10) 
 
In response, Javier Solana, on behalf of the European Union, announced today 
that he was “concerned about the political situation in Ukraine.” (11) He is, no 
doubt, not alone. 
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